Abstract: International Relations scholars' use of the domestic analogy to explain international outcomes — and their focus on anarchy as a chief structural determinant — is central to many salient debates in the discipline. Surprisingly, while these debates have produced sophisticated theorizing about international anarchy, they have ignored the body of thought which addresses anarchy at the domestic level: classical anarchism. When viewed through the domestic analogy lens, anarchism opens interesting and underutilized venues for IR theory. This paper seeks to explore those venues by adding the voice of anarchist philosophy to the existing debate. We review the domestic analogy IR literature, finding that it treats anarchy as 'negative' structural constraint narrowly derived from the social contractarian state of nature. We supplement this account of anarchy with a 'positive' image derived from classical anarchism, and explore possible research areas where anarchist insights can add to our understanding of global phenomena.

Keywords: Social contract theory, domestic analogy, classical anarchism, anarchy, state of nature.
“...the anarchist archetype of the nineteenth-century terrorist – eyes borderline mad, revolver in one hand, bomb in the other – lingers long after its ideological origins have been forgotten, its technology antiquated.”

“Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture on the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

The quotes above highlight two enduring images of anarchy: one of the individual anarchist — the radical who seeks the destruction of society through violence; and a second of systemic anarchy, the “state of nature” where free men wage a war of every man against every man because there is no power able to “over-awe them all”³. The first, introduced in the revolutions of 19th century Europe, has appeared as a site of social resistance everywhere from the Spanish Civil War to the Battle in Seattle, on Sex Pistols LPs to mass-production t-shirts adorned with the globally-famous anarchist banner, the

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3 Ibid., 75.
encircled capital-A. It shows us anarchism as rebellion, “the creed of bomb-throwing desperadoes wishing to pull down civilization.”

The second image remains the purview of a much smaller and isolated clan: International Relations (IR) scholars, who have taken Hobbes' colourful description of domestic anarchy and used it, by way of a device called the “domestic analogy,” to describe the international system. This 'assumption of anarchy' in International Relations scholarship has, to be sure, produced sophisticated theorizing about world politics. Anarchy as a descriptor of a global deep structure has informed all of IR's major paradigms, and major recent attempts at broadening these paradigms have taken both the anarchy assumption and domestic analogy for granted. IR scholars have also become more self-conscious about their use of anarchy, criticizing its use on heuristic, empirical, and explanatory grounds.

Missing in this discussion, however, is an analysis of how IR scholars' use of anarchy as an organizing principle and the values they attach to that principle fundamentally structures the discipline's theoretical horizons. Following the practice turn in International Relations, we acknowledge that a key component of social action is the “inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes

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5 Following Went, we use International Relations, and IR as its abbreviation, to indicate the academic study of world politics. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.


what is to be done appear 'self-evident' or commonsensical". We argue that IR scholars' use of anarchy, because it is useful in explaining violence in world politics, is subject to such a logic of practicality. Put differently, what IR scholars do not think about anarchy — the practices that inform their use of anarchy as an organizing principle and the values that inform those practices — plays a fundamental role in shaping both anarchy itself and the range of possibilities within it.

This paper argues that IR scholars' use of anarchy and its attendant criticisms are couched in a “negative” image of anarchy drawn from social contract theory. This image holds that anarchy is a structure which constrains the actors within it and sets the “boundary conditions” for the system of international political actors. Anarchy conceived as such is a “negative” source of authority which prescribes possible international outcomes and organizes those possibilities around the principles of uncertainty and violence. According to this view, the problems of anarchy can only be escaped — and its inherent violence averted — through the replication of the “positive” sources of domestic authority at the domestic level.

To be sure, social contractarian anarchism has proven useful for thinking about world politics as a theatre of Hobbesian conflict, Kantian “friendships,” or even hierarchies. But the limitations of such an image of anarchy are argued to be increasingly unable to explain international phenomena, prompting many reconceptualizations of the global deep structure. This movement toward alternative

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8 Pouliot, 'The Logic of Practicality', 258.

9 Alexander Wendt, 'Why A World State is Inevitable', European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003), 500.

10 Wendt, Social Theory, 297-308.


accounts would be less problematic if it did not treat the anarchy it seeks to supplant in social contractarian terms, or if it successfully subsumed the explanatory power offered by orthodox accounts.

By expanding the image of anarchy beyond social contractarianism, we argue that IR scholarship can fill in gaps in orthodox accounts without needing to reject anarchy — and its explanatory power — as an organizing principle. To achieve such a broadening, we introduce alternative images of anarchy drawn from the philosophical tradition of classical anarchist political thought. Often ignored by academics in both political theory and International Relations, anarchism counts among its most important advocates names that conjure neither nihilistic delinquents nor systemic wars of all against all: Tolstoy, Gandhi, Laozi, Godwin, Paine. Political theories of anarchy vary widely from one to the next, but common among them is the shared belief that a stateless society is not something to be suppressed or dismissed as the progeny of irresponsible youth, but should instead be sought, established, and managed in the name of human freedom and justice.

Classical anarchy represents just one of many possible images of anarchy which can complement or critique the negative image used by IR theorists. We present it here because although anarchy is arguably the most important concept in IR and the domestic analogy its dominant method of framing world politics, the whole body of political theory which concerns itself with domestic-level anarchies — anarchism — has been left unexplored by IR scholars. Even if the dominant images of anarchy used by IR indeed remain useful, this fact alone does not discount the value which can be added to our overall understanding of international life by alternative or complementary accounts of global order. Our paper thus has an ulterior, heuristic goal: it aims to enrich the tradition in IR of thinking about world politics in terms of domestic politics — “the domestic analogy” — by creating a meaningful dialogue between International Relations scholarship and political theories of domestic and 29.

13 For others — such as Hegel, Clausewitz, and Aristotle — and a more sustained critique of IR's use of anarchy than is presented here, see LaRoche: 'Empty Hierarchies, Hollow Anarchies' (forthcoming).
anarchy. By envisioning anarchy and freedom as co-constitutive, rather than oppositional, anarchist political thought potentially expands our ability to understand an international system in which the role of ideas and identity are increasingly identified as important elements of international life. Put differently, by introducing anarchist political thought to IR scholarship and creating a dialogue between these two traditions, we hope that both sides will benefit from the exchange.

This paper proceeds in four sections. In the first, we critique IR's practice of “negative” anarchy and discuss, briefly, existing debates within IR which surround this image. In the second, we review the broad trends of anarchist political theory, taking care to differentiate the major historical approaches. In the final section, we compare and contrast images of anarchy in IR with their counterparts in classical anarchism and suggest possible research areas where anarchist insights can add to our understanding of global phenomena.

~ I ~

The Practice of Anarchy in International Relations

Perhaps the most widespread assumption in International Relations is that the international system is best described as an anarchy. As Richard K. Ashley has noted, “among theorists interested in problems of global collaboration and international order, the ‘fact of anarchy’ has long been understood as a foundational truth, a self-evident limit that virtually defines the compass of imaginable possibility”. Although specific accounts of the 'anarchy problematique' in IR have been subject to

14 Robert Art and Robert Jervis observe that “anarchy is the fundamental fact of international relations.” In Milner, 'The Assumption of Anarchy', 68.

criticism\textsuperscript{16}, the use of anarchy as an organizing principle in mainstream IR scholarship endures\textsuperscript{17}. Anarchy is assumed as such by the dominant expressions of all three of IR’s major paradigms\textsuperscript{18}, and even provides a starting point for some critical IR scholarship\textsuperscript{19} and recent theories of international relations which pitch structural alternatives to anarchy\textsuperscript{20}.

When applied to the world politics, anarchy is held to mean that the international system is “without a ruler” — the literal meaning of \textit{anarkhía} (“leaderless”) which is derived from \textit{anarkhos} ('an' meaning 'without' and 'arkhos' meaning leader, ergo, 'without leader')\textsuperscript{21}. IR theorists arrive at this description of world politics by using the 'domestic analogy,' a heuristic device which holds that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} See for example Lake, \textit{Hierarchy in International Relations}; and Daniel H. Deudney, \textit{Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory From the Polis to the Global Village} (Princeton, NJ: 2007), which won the 2010 International Studies Association “book of the decade” award.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} For neorealism see Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} and John J. Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics} (New York: Norton, 2001); for neoliberalism see Keohane, \textit{After Hegemony}; for constructivism see Wendt, \textit{Social Theory}.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} David Keyt, 'Aristotle and Anarchism', \textit{Reason Papers} 18 (Fall 1993), 135; Ruth Kinna, \textit{Anarchism} (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 9; Marshall, \textit{A History of Anarchism}, x.
\end{itemize}
relations among states in the international system are “amenable to the same type of institutional
control as the relations of individuals and groups within states”\textsuperscript{22}.'Anarchy' in IR is thus taken to imply,
at base, that states are the most important international actors because no authority exists above them.
Whereas individuals in a state must obey the law of the land lest they be held accountable by the
coercive authority of the state (ergo, their sovereignty is \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} upwardly delegated to the
state) states in the international system are sovereign only downward, and do not upwardly delegate
their sovereignty like individuals do. 'Anarchy' in IR thus marks the upward limiting principle of
sovereignty — from individual to sovereign — as the sovereign state. As John Mearsheimer puts it,
anarchy “is an ordering principle, which says that the system compromises independent states that have
no central authority above them. Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no
higher ruling body in the international system. There is no 'government over governments'”\textsuperscript{23}.

This image of anarchy is accompanied in IR scholarship by a second inference: war and
violence in the international system are attributable to anarchy and the uncertainty it creates in the
international system\textsuperscript{24}. This inference too is based on a domestic analogy: whereas individuals at the
domestic level enjoy reasonable certainty that agreements they make with other individuals (including,
as it were, their acceptance of the laws of the land) will be honoured because a sovereign authority is
able to enforce them, such certainty about agreements cannot exist at the international level. The key
component of domestic certainty — coercive authority — is simply missing at the international level.

As noted above, this 'practice of anarchy' has been subject to fruitful debate. Helen Milner has

\textsuperscript{22} Hidemi Suganami, \textit{The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 173.

\textsuperscript{23} Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}, 31.

argued that the empirical division between domestic and international is not perfectly binary, while others have made efforts to broaden the range of possible 'logics' or configurations of international anarchy so that they better explain instances of economic cooperation, "we-feelings", and systemic-level change. Some have even attempted to explain world politics using totally different system analogies. A recent argument made by constructivists is that anarchy may mean different things to


26 Keohane, After Hegemony.


different actors under different circumstances, and thus anarchy “is what states make of it”\textsuperscript{30}. What these theories of anarchy all share, we will argue below, is the inference that anarchy (because it lacks a ruler) is \textit{a priori} associated with uncertainty and violence, and efforts to reduce violence must involve some kind of \textit{mediation} or \textit{escape} from anarchy's systemic effects, be this via balances of power, regional security communities\textsuperscript{31}, hierarchies established among specific dyads of states\textsuperscript{32}, or a world state\textsuperscript{33}.

Traditionally, arguments about the likelihood of escaping or mediating anarchy have been couched in the political philosophies of a small number of major classical political thinkers or inferences about human nature\textsuperscript{34}. Neorealism (and after it neoliberalism) broke with this tradition when it attempted to


\textsuperscript{31} Adler and Greve call this mediation “security governance.” Adler and Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power', 654-65.

\textsuperscript{32} Lake, \textit{Hierarchy in International Relations}; Lake, 'Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations', Donnelly, 'Sovereign Inequalities'.

\textsuperscript{33} Wendt, 'Why a World State is Inevitable'.

explain inferences about state behaviour on purely systemic grounds via a “rationality assumption”\textsuperscript{35}. This rational-structural approach to world politics holds that IR scholars can predict patterns of unit behaviour within a given system from the assumption that the units in the system will make decisions based on a fixed set of preferences, which are in turn determined by the boundary conditions of the system. Scholars in the rational-structural vein have inferred that if the system lacks a central authority and contains limited but necessary resources, as world politics do, the system will be uncertain and prone to violence if the units compete over finite resources. Those rational units which seek to maximize their power relative to other units in the system, so that they can best acquire and protect resources, will thus survive the longest\textsuperscript{36}.

Alexander Wendt, among others, has pointed out that to predict unit behaviour in such a system, scholars must assign to the units some additional content — we must avoid making them “ontologically primitive”\textsuperscript{37} — and theorize how such units might interpret anarchy\textsuperscript{38}. Because material reality can (according to the constructivist turn in IR\textsuperscript{39}) be interpreted in different ways, multiple cultures or “logics” of the ‘reality’ of anarchy are possible\textsuperscript{40}. The range of possibilities of escaping or mitigating

\textsuperscript{35} Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, 182.

\textsuperscript{36} Waltz, 'Theory of International Politics'; and Mearsheimer, 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'. It should be noted that Mearsheimer argues the units will seek absolute gains in power, rather than be content with relative gains, because an 'offensive' or absolute gains outlook is the best way to guarantee relative advantage.

\textsuperscript{37} Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 335-70.

\textsuperscript{38} Wendt, Social Theory.

\textsuperscript{39} Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (September 1997): 319-63.

\textsuperscript{40} Wendt, Social Theory, 249.
anarchies effects are thus couched in the boundary conditions which states infer on anarchy itself. Recent scholarship in this constructivist vein has explored how multiple system of security governance might exist at a single time\textsuperscript{41}, how the historical-cultural origins of international war and conflict affect systemic outcomes\textsuperscript{42}, and whether micro and macro-level mechanisms of might lead to a world state\textsuperscript{43}. These ideational critiques of the rational-structural account of anarchy have, to be sure, broadened significantly the possible boundary conditions of the global deep structure. If anarchy is indeed “an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic”\textsuperscript{44}, derivations of logics of anarchy should be unlimited: anarchy is not only what states make of it, but anything states make of it.

But the practice of anarchy in IR has remained narrow: despite their differences, the dominant IR theories share a common reliance on a social contractarian image of anarchy which views the absence of centralized rule as an uncertain and violent state of nature, and through which solutions to the international state of nature should replicate, inasmuch as possible, the domestic sources of security. The section that follows briefly outlines this image.

\textbf{II~}

\textbf{Social Contract Theory and the State of Nature}

A central element of social contractarianism is the idea that sovereign individuals enter into a political pact — a 'social contract'— in order to escape a government-less existence called “the state of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{41} Adler and Greve, 'When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance'.


\textsuperscript{43} Wendt, 'Why a World State is Inevitable'.

\textsuperscript{44} Wendt, Social Theory, 249.}
nature. Though often treated as synonymous with international anarchy by IR scholars, the state of nature should be differentiated from its IR equivalent. Whereas IR scholarship treats anarchy as an empirical reality, the principal social contract theorists explicitly treated in IR — Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and John Locke — are generally ambiguous regarding whether the state of nature should be treated as an actual period in history or (as David Hume suggested) a rhetorical device which has historical and empirical facsimiles.

Nonetheless, strong commonalities can be found between IR's treatment of anarchy and the state of nature. The major social contract theorists use the state of nature to describe world politics, which they characterize as lacking a single ruler or sovereign, much as anarchy is characterized in IR. With the exception of Immanuel Kant, social contract theorists are furthermore skeptical of the possibility of any escape from the international state of nature. As Locke writes in the Second Treatise on Government: “all Princes and Rulers of Independent Governments all through the World, are in a

45 Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. A second roster might include Baron de Montesquieu, Edmund Burke, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick, and David Hume. We believe this selection to be uncontroversial, though we invite suggestions.

46 Edwin Curley argues that Hobbes “is not necessarily talking about the pre-historical condition of the human race, or what life was like in the primitive societies of his day, or about a condition which is merely a theoretical possibility. He is talking about any situation where there is no effective government to impose order.” Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii, xxi, 11. For a more recent argument along these lines in IR literature, see Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'Flies in Our Eyes: Man, the Economy, and War,' Millenium 38, no. 2 (August 2009): 241-267. See also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 333-334.


48 Kant, Political Writings, 105, 165. For Rousseau's rather skeptical views on the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's peace plan — Kant's source material — see footnote 46.
State of Nature... 'tis not every Compact that puts an end to the State of Nature between Men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick”

As noted, the central aim of social contract theory is the emancipation of man from the domestic lawless state of nature into a condition of civil constitution. Social contractarianism holds that this is done through the establishment of a coercive authority to whom all parties consent via an ahistorical original contract. This does not mean in all cases that the state of nature is “all bad,” and must be done away with by establishing any civil constitution. Indeed, the social contract theorists do not hold that human beings are inherently evil, but rather argue that the structure of anarchy selects man’s selfish and violent passions. Man’s inability to trust his fellows thus leads to the problems that arise in the state of nature. Social contractarianism does not hold that any political organization outside the state of nature is preferable, because some political configurations may worsen man's original condition.

A balance is as such to be struck in the social contract between two poles: anarchy, on the one end, in which individuals are fully autonomous and free of from constraint but live in a condition of lawlessness and uncertainty; and totality on the other, wherein individual freedoms are made fully compliant with the general will, via authoritarian coercion. On this spectrum, Locke, normally

49 Locke, *Two Treatises*, 276-7.
50 Locke, *Two Treatises*, 330-49; Kant, *Political Writings*, 162.
53 The formal (versus practical) truth of this pole, in which autonomous individuals are free from all constraint, can only exist if there are so few humans on Earth that they never come into contact with one another, or if there is only one human.
54 Here to grasp the formal truth of what we mean, one might imagine – and we must apologize for not having a better example – the Borg. The moment in which the state totalizes the individual — upon incarceration, perhaps, or in
associated with the Neoliberal approach to IR, is decidedly 'anarchy-first': he holds that any imposition of totality can only be justified if it eradicates the undesired effects of anarchy and transposes its desired effects into the new political configuration\(^55\). If the imposition of totality does not meet this standard, the state of nature continues to be the preferred state of being. For Hobbes the undesired effects of anarchy are acute\(^56\), and thus virtually any escape from the state of nature is desirable — whereas Locke is more fearful that totality will place man in a worse condition than the state of nature\(^57\). Locke therefore places greater demands on political organization than Hobbes: the domestic state must solve the problems of anarchy and ideally do little else because man is otherwise be free.

Despite these differences, both Hobbes and Locke use a negative conception of anarchy to explain why a naturally free human being would choose to restrict his or her own freedom. Although within anarchy man as a 'unit' is free because he is rational, and capable of choice, the systemic effects of anarchy (cheating, stealing, killing, etc.) should be done away with by the upward-delegation of individual sovereignty to a civil constitution, toward totality. Thus anarchy as a \textit{structural} element contains no inherent 'good'; the good in anarchy, as it were, is contained 'in the units,' in man and his ability to use reason to discover natural rights and laws\(^58\).

Finally, Immanuel Kant is more difficult to place on the anarchy-totality spectrum because he explicitly theorizes an international politics which, at first glance, are distinct from his domestic

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\textsuperscript{56} Hobbes' descriptions of the ills of the state of nature are the stuff of legend; if the opening quotation does not suffice, see Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 74-78.

\textsuperscript{57} For Locke's depiction of the state of nature, see Locke, \textit{Two Treatises}, 269-82; for his fear of tyranny, see Ibid., 284 and footnote 54.

\textsuperscript{58} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 74-6, 78; Locke, \textit{Two Treatises}, 269, 271, 308-9, 318-9, 336, 343, etc.

Bentham's Panopticon — is a close approximation.
political theory: eternal peace established through a confederation of republics. Nonetheless, Kant employs the domestic analogy himself in his philosophy of eternal peace. Kant argues that world politics is a state of nature which can only be escaped through the establishment of a global doctrine of Recht. Because of state of nature is lawless and contrary to reason, such an escape is man's immediate duty. Thus even in the international thought of Kant, whose goals of emancipation appeal to constructivists and foundational critical theorists, anarchy is conceived of in the negative sense — as a structure which regardless of the good will of free beings produces uncertainty and war. For Kant, only the units of the system — autonomous, rational man and his ability to aspire to universal law, and republican states which aspire to perpetual peace — contain the positive elements of international life; anarchy as a structural element contains only negative boundary conditions which create endemic uncertainty and lawlessness, and which should be escaped as soon as possible.

59 Kant, *Political Writings*, 90, 102-5.
60 Ibid., 91-92, 131-75, 164-5.
61 Ibid., 98, 165, 167, 171.
62 Ibid., 136-7, 165.
64 Wendt, *Social Theory*, 297-308; and Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground'; *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachman (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1997).
65 See for example Kant, *Political Writings*, 137-8.
66 It should be noted here that while war is condemned in the Kant's political theory, it is a historical motivator necessary for perpetual peace. See for example Allen W. Wood, *Kant* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 110-28. Rousseau is more difficult to consider here because he endorses a historically-contingent theory of the state of nature and social contract. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Basic Political Writings*, eds. Donald A. Cress and Peter Gay (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). Rousseau believes the state of war to have arisen from man's relation to things, i.e. proprietary relations, which exists neither in the state of nature nor under a civil constitution, and therefore only exists between states (Ibid., 145-
Anarchist Political Thought

In sharp contrast to the image of anarchy posited by social contract theorists is that of anarchist thinkers proper. As noted in the introduction, 'anarchism' is a term which conjures a self-contradictory set of images. Confusion about the broader meaning of anarchy is a recurring theme, even within the study of anarchism itself. Nevertheless, some common factors to all anarchists can be deduced. It is generally agreed that all anarchists deny, or at least challenge, authority and hierarchy in all its forms. As Robert Graham notes, what anarchists share is “opposition to coercive authority and hierarchical relationships based on power, wealth, or privilege. In contrast to other radicals, they also reject any authoritarian or privileged

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67 Disagreements abound on issues such as the treatment of property, whether anarchism can be truly socialist, and the usefulness of violence as a means of social change. This problem is not particularly recent: Paul Elzbacher, writing in 1908, notes that “at present there is the greatest lack of clear ideas about Anarchism, and that not only among the masses but among the scholars and statesmen”. Paul Elzbacher, The Great Anarchists: Ideas and Teachings of Seven Major Thinkers, trans. Steven T. Byington (first published New York:: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1908; Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), 3.

68 Sebastien Faure defined the anarchist as “whoever denies authority and fights against it”, though George Woodcock notes in his history of anarchism, “…by no means all who deny authority and fight against it can reasonably be called anarchist.” Woodcock defines anarchism as a “doctrine which poses a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to the other.” Peter Marshall defines anarchism as “a critique of the existing order, a vision of a free society, and a way to achieve it.” George Woodcock, Anarchism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 11; Marshall, A History of Anarchism, 1.
role for themselves in the struggle against authority and in the creation of a free society”69. Marshall continues: “All anarchists reject the legitimacy of external government and of the State, and condemn imposed political authority, hierarchy, and domination”70.

Beyond this agreement the various schools of anarchism agree on little else. Anarcho-capitalists, for example, venerate the free market, whereas anarcho-syndicalists oppose the market in all its forms. That anarchism stems “largely from a moral conviction of the virtues of the simpler life” is true for some schools of anarchism71, but breaks down quickly when one looks to formulate a definition of 'the simpler life' upon which all anarchists can agree.

A starting point for a positive theory of anarchism can be found by comparing anarchists to social contract theorists and their theories of the state of nature. While liberal social contractarianism advocates the “sovereignty of the people,” anarchism instead argues for the “sovereignty of the person”72. Most importantly, social contractarianism sees anarchy a negative structural determinant of human behaviour which produces a social condition bereft of true human freedom. The state, even if it too limits human freedom, will always be less undesirable than anarchy. Order for social contractarianism is a political creation; man, in his quest for order, becomes a political animal, a governed animal.

Anarchists, by contrast, argue that “rule is unnecessary for the preservation of order”73. This is not simply because anarchists necessarily view the imposition of external rule as coercive or unjust; indeed, the central argument made by social contractarianism is that such external rule is ideally

70 Marshall, A History of Anarchism, 1.
71 Woodcock, Anarchism, 26.
72 Ibid., 30.
73 Ibid., 12.
voluntary, and therefore noncoercive. The main anarchist critique of social contractarianism is that the 'social contract' as it were is unnecessary and potentially harmful because social order exists independently of governmental rule, an observation which dates to Bao Jingyan's 400CE writings. Classical anarchists thus echo Hedley Bull's proclamation that society can exist in the absence of authority—“anarchical society”—but they go further: a human being is more, and perhaps only, free when he or she is liberated from coercive structures. True society is thus only achievable in a state of statelessness, wherein the upward limit of sovereignty is left at personhood. Political sovereignty, insofar as it has meaning for anarchists, can therefore rightly exist only at the individual level.

Classical anarchism thus reverses the totality-anarchy spectrum of social contractarianism. Where totality for the social contract theorists means the voluntary submission of unchecked individual freedom to a legitimate coercive body, for classical anarchists totality is the source of violence and uncertainty and any imposition of it on anarchy is both unjust and consequentially negative. Even if anarchy is a suboptimal outcome, they argue, it is less so than man's existence within a state. As William Godwin, an early anarchist, wrote in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,

Anarchy is a horrible calamity, but it is less horrible than despotism. Where anarchy has slain its hundreds, despotism has sacrificed millions upon millions, with this only effect, to perpetuate ignorance, the vices, and the misery of mankind.

Following Godwin, anarchists seek to establish anarchy as systemic condition so that its structural

75 Graham, Anarchism, 1-4.
77 Woodcock, Anarchism, 1-30.
78 Eltzbacher, The Great Anarchists, 41.
characteristics are able to allow men and women realize freedom — they seek to establish, in other words, “a decentralized and self-regulating society consisting of a federation of voluntary associations of free and equal individuals... a free society which allows all human being to realize their full potential”79.

Individualism

It is with this strong emphasis on the the flourishing of the individual that anarchy as a modern political philosophy, and movement at large, is conceived. The first anarchist philosophers, apart from Daoist and possibly Confucian antecedents in China80, begin with Godwin and his successor Max Stirner. In this early stage anarchism rejected private property and focussed on the stateless individual as a site for ethical action. Both Godwin and Stirner offer radically individualist accounts of anarchy which imagine free unions of men who adhere to anarchist principles of social justice and reject coercive authority81. For Godwin this meant establishing a balance between determination and free will (wherein Godwin advocates that man act as if he were free), and recognizing man is limited as a self-legislating being by his powers of perception; the powers of government most potently operate against the mind and its perception, and thus to freely pursue perfectibility or social justice, man must resist government, which has everywhere created injustice82. The social contract, despite its just premises, “seeks to bind one


80 There is much debate in the anarchy literature on who the 'first' anarchists are. Robert Graham, for example, includes in his compendium of anarchist thinkers Bao Jingyan's essay 'Neither Lord Nor Subject'. Long has argued that Confucian scholars in ancient China may be the first anarchists. See Graham, Anarchism, 2-4; Marshall, A History of Anarchism, 53-66; and Roderick T. Long, 'Austro-Libertarian Themes in Early Confucianism', Journal of Libertarian Studies 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 35-62.

81 Eltzbacher, The Great Anarchists, 40-64; Woodcock, Anarchism, 54-80; Graham, Anarchism, 12-22.

82 Woodcock, Anarchism, 65-8.
generation by the promises of another. It negates the obligation of each individual to exercise his private judgment on what is right". Stateless justice for Godwin entails the mutual deliberation, through an appeal to universal right, of individual goods and common goods. When common or collective decisions are confined to the “public support of justice,” they are good; when they do not, free men must resist them. Thus the “general welfare” and social life outside the state are connected; property among enlightened men — the only men who can belong to Godwin's anarchism — is to be treated in a sort of “voluntary communism”.

Stirner, in contrast to Godwin, advocates no such appeal to socially-rooted wellbeing nor to any universal morality. Instead, Stirner posits a Nietzschean theory of 'ownness' in which man sees himself in conflict with society at large and emphasizes, as the site of freedom, his 'uniqueness'. Man in this condition is compelled to actuate his apartness from society by the use of any means; he rejects the laws and customs of society as the implements of statism, including private property. Such an 'egoist' is encouraged to join in communion with other like-minded individuals in a club bereft of universal rules and restrictions apart from those which are made for convenience.

In constructing a world of Egoism, the individual in Stirner's anarchy follows his will and passions rather than reason. Egoistic anarchism is an habitus which borders on the nihilistic, but still carries with it a cohesive theory in which the laws and morals of rule-based society are juxtaposed

83 Ibid, 69.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Elztbacher, The Great Anarchists, 47.
88 Woodcock, Anarchism, 81.
90 Woodcock, Anarchism, 85.
against in favour of an ad-hoc constellation of ethics and maxims, Self and Other. The full realization of this Egoistic condition can only come about with the overthrow of government and rule, “the worship of collective man.” Its apotheosis — anti-individual restriction — is for Stirner the product of political oppression, the stifling of man's ability to achieve 'ownness' and full unique self-expression.

**Mutualism**

Following in the footsteps of Godwin's appeal to the “general welfare” and against the accumulation of capital is Proudhon, who advocates a system of mutual exchange relations amongst persons as a middle-ground between capitalism and communism, the individual excesses of Stirner and Godwin's emphasis on the common good. As Woodock notes, “if we define Stirner as an egoistic individualist, we must define Proudhon as a social individualist”91. For Proudhon, there is no such thing as an isolated being — men exist in a social milieu with other men. Even if the individual is to be valorized as the well-spring of freedom, to disregard the social or cast the social as oppositional to the individual is to greatly simplify the anarchist's objective. Thus while the individual is the starting point for Proudhon, society provides the “matrix” in which the individual is able to actualize freedom.

With Proudhon's theory of mutualism anarchism moves out of radical individualism and into a spectrum of social action where communal cooperation plays an essential role in the individual's realization of freedom. Proudhon acknowledges that 'possession' — that is, the right to control those items necessary for living, including land, shelter, and equipment — is an essential element of man's rightful autonomy. But 'property', defined as material goods expropriated or used as leverage against others, is opposed by Proudhon's theory — hence his famous proclamation that “property is theft”92. Communism, because it eradicates man's ability to possess, is opposed by mutualism just as much as

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91 Ibid., 92.
unadulterated capitalism. Proudhon's solution to the property/possession problem is the creation of free contractual organizations which replicate government's necessary functions, but do not reproduce its authoritarian and abusive tendencies, which mutualists identify as the source of violence in both capitalist and communist states.⁹³

**Anarcho-syndicalism and collectivism**

Anarcho-syndicalism, a radicalized version of mutualism which gained tremendous popularity in the 19th and 20th centuries, traces its roots to the historical break in the First International between the followers of Karl Marx, who advocated in their theories of revolution the centralization of power and a dictatorship of the proletariat; and the followers of Mikhail Bakunin, who argued that a worker's revolution should organize itself internally so that it does not simply replicate the “organized authority, domination, and power of the possessing classes over the masses”⁹⁴. Anarcho-syndicalists argue for the control of the means of production by voluntary organizations of workers, arranged by trade into non-hierarchical syndicates. Under such a syndicalism, capitalist wage systems are dismantled according to the maxim “from each according to ability, to each according need”, and property is (like in communism) shared communally. Anarcho-syndicalists focus on the efforts of the collective — the syndicate — more so than on the individual within that syndicate. Anarcho-syndicalism still enjoys popularity in the 21st century, particularly among socialist theorists who are skeptical of communism's call for a temporary centralized state.⁹⁵

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Anarcho-capitalism

The final variant of anarchism presented here, anarcho-capitalism, finds its roots in the modern American Libertarian movement and the writings of Austrian School economists and thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Robert Nozick. Anarcho-capitalists do not differ from the other schools of anarchism in their emphasis on the individual as the most important locus of ethical action. They do differ from other variants in one significant respect, however: rather than seeking to supplant the capitalist system, which is argued to limit or wholly destroy human freedom, anarcho-capitalists argue for the replacement of the state by unregulated markets. Anarcho-capitalist thinkers such as Murray Rothbard and David Friedman argue that any exchange relation not based on free exchange is inherently coercive — hence all 'exchanges' which take place within the state are coerced and therefore unjust. Anarcho-capitalists thus reject the state based on the non-aggression principle much as mutualist and syndicalist variants of anarchism do, but also reject mutual exchange relations or communistic exchange relations as also being coercive. Such exchange relations artificially fix commodity values in parity with each other, or with (for example) a certain amount of labour. This outcome is not reflective of true value as determined by market forces, and is as such unjust or coercive. In the anarcho-capitalist image of anarchy, free enterprises replace state functions in all spectra of social and economic life, including security, health care, and education.


Anarchy and Totality in International Relations

The theories above provide IR scholars with an alternate image of anarchy from that of the social contract theorists: a positive theory of anarchism in which statelessness enables social order and where the units of the system are emancipated from the socio-political confines of the coercive state and made free to determine the boundary conditions of social reality.

The major IR theories of the last century, with the possible exception of the English School, have ignored this image of anarchy, possibly because social contractarianism's reliance on reason is less openly normative and thus more congruent with IR’s desire for a norm-free, scientific approach to world politics. IR scholarship has thus imagined the global deep structure along social contractarian lines, often explicitly analogizing from the state of nature.98 The implicit effect of this domestic analogy is IR scholars’ reliance on an image of anarchy which is indeed value-laden. It associates anarchy with violence and uncertainty, and calls for solutions which are rooted in man's moral duty to establish domestic authority. In attempting to adopt a practice of anarchy which is value-free, IR theorists have thus ironically put themselves in a cryptonormative 'Anarchy Straitjacket': anarchy is, like the state of nature, a 'problem'; totality is its only 'solution'.

For Realists, only balances of power can temporarily alleviate the otherwise nasty and brutal business of world politics.99 Because balances of power best achieve state survival, world politics

98 This observation abounds in IR literature though often using slightly different terms. For a thorough examination, see for example Deudney, Bounding Power, 6-20, 77.

becomes a function of living out, again and again, acts of balancing, achieved through either internal balancing (using the domestic authority of the state to increase state power) or through alliances (using temporary social contracts to replicate limited aspects of domestic security). International life for the Realist is thus largely one of bare survival because the sources of domestic authority are almost impossible to recreate at the international level. The image of a Hobbesian state of nature, in which “law and order collapse and the destructive passions of man run riot”\(^{100}\), prevails in this image of anarchy.

For Neoliberals, the Hobbesian anarchy and its attendant security dilemmas can be transcended in those areas where principles of property and free-exchange (which Locke held to be possible in the state of nature) allow international political actors to focus on Pareto-optimal outcomes and absolute gains rather than relative ones. Economic cooperation can overcome coordination problems where substantial agreement on solutions already exists and where international institutions can be setup to create dependable expectations\(^{101}\). Outside of these Lockean regimes, however, a Hobbesian state of war persists in the Neoliberal account of international anarchy\(^{102}\).

Democratic peace theorists and security communities researchers offer the most promising account of anarchy. Nevertheless, they still describe a global ordering principle that is fundamentally violent. These theorists highlight Kantian friendships and interdependent liberal states in which international actors are able to establish lasting peace\(^{103}\). But even these confederations of free states

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cannot totally transcend the problems of anarchy: they are, by Kant's own admission, a lesser-of-all-evils in which the violent effects of anarchy are only been mediated for a few and persist — are even exacerbated — outside of the community. The final end of such a Kantian friendship is a globally-encompassing state, which Kant explicitly rejected on grounds it would be tyrannical, or an amalgamated security community in which the logic of community actually replaces anarchy as an ordering principle. On all counts, anarchy is negative.

Finally, in Wendt's argument that multiple logics of anarchy are concurrently realizable, the realm of possible anarchies is, following Martin Wight, limited to logics based on the states of nature of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. Even in the Kantian logic, anarchy is taken to be associated, a priori, with violence and uncertainty: the units in the system mitigate the negative effects of anarchy through imagining their relations with other states differently: friendship, legal precedence, and whatnot. Even though anarchy is pitched as infinitely adaptable, Wendt's theory is still trapped in the straitjacket: states as the loci of authority — legitimate violence — at the domestic-level are now associated with illegitimate violence at the international level, which finds as its source the uncertainty that anarchy creates.

If we take positive images of anarchy seriously, we are given a very different picture of international life. The a priori assumption of this positive image of anarchy is simple: anarchy is not only what

42.; and John MacMillan, 'Immanuel Kant and the Democratic Peace' in Classical Theory in International Relations, ed. Beate Jahn. For Kant's connection to security communities, see Williams, 'The Social Construction of Security Communities'.

104 Kant, Political Writings, 90, 105, 113-4.
105 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 6-7, 29-30.
106 Wendt, Social Theory.
107 Wendt, Social Theory, 249-257.
international political actors make of it, but also how those actors are able to make anything at all. An anarchy in which political actors desire violence should, at least in part, value norms of violence; an anarchy in which political actors desire mutual fair trade should value its corresponding norms. Anarchy is no longer a preexisting negative constraint, but structure under which international life — and what we make of it — is emancipated a priori from specifically violent boundary conditions.

In some cases, this positive image of anarchy complements existing ones. Stirner's vision of Egoistic anarchism, for example, in which free men create a club of sorts and where members are beholden to no rules apart from those of their own expedient design, sheds light on alliance dynamics, balances of power, and the boundaries of security governance amongst the most powerful nations in the system. Egoism in world politics predicts that these states not only join a separate peace, but limit its membership to the privileged few and predicate its identity on a hierarchical separateness from inferior 'Others'. The Egoistic anarchy can thus explain, in part, the empirical finding that states in the liberal peace often go to war with non-democracies. It gives us a different vantage point from which we might understand how certain types of states in the international system seek ontological security by establishing identities of Otherness (particularly in terms of the norms of the 'Egoistic' club setting the limits of 'normal' international behaviour so that exclude, for example, 'Rogue States') and the normative conditions under which antagonistic Self-Other/Normal-Deviant narratives, essential elements of an ontological security predicated on Otherness, can be sustained. Our security communities and Kantian friendships, under the Egoist rubric, become clubs of Westphalian sovereign exclusion which seek recognitive status by transgressing against 'inferiors'.

108 Doyle, 'Kant and Liberal Internationalism'.


Applying a mutualist lens to the international system helps us re-frame power dynamics between North and South, developing and developed world, or amongst members of established security communities and trading blocs which seek economic fairness and appropriateness. Mutualism emphasizes contracts made among equal parties in which hierarchies based on material gain are strictly avoided. To this extent, Proudhon theorized the distinction between 'possession' (the fruits of one's labour) and 'property' (the coerced removal of one's labour for sale by another party). The sources of violence and contestation, Proudhon argued, come only as a result of property and the state mechanisms needed to coercively enforce it. This 'possession/property' distinction applied to world politics reconfigures violence ontologically so that it is only subverted and hidden, not alleviated, by absolute-gain economic exchanges, which are in turn configured here around sets of 'fair' norms and rules by the economically powerful so that the economic structures which privilege the rich—a variation of Nye's 'Soft Power'—are productively reified. The third leg of the Kantian triangle which is held by contemporary scholars to be a key element of global peace — the spirit of commerce\textsuperscript{111} — is thus recast by mutualism as a question: whose peace?

Moreover, by integrating into IR’s use of the domestic analogy conceptions of order, production and exchange from anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism on the one hand, and anarcho-syndicalism and collectivism on the other, important steps can be taken — in light of criticisms of mainstream IR theory by Rosenberg, Buzan and Little, and Ashley among others\textsuperscript{112} — to integrate dynamics of global economic systems into theorizing about international political outcomes. Moving beyond a traditional realist understanding of the economy as something to be mobilized by the modern state, the


incorporation of anarchist political philosophy into the use of the domestic analogy is better equipped to understand national economies as part of what Rosenberg calls a transnational whole, producing important political effects independent of the agency of states. Each of the anarchist philosophical traditions discussed here have conceptions of political order, as well as economic production and exchange, that operate in the absence of the hierarchical institutional domination of the state, potentially aiding IR theorists in their attempts to shed the “Westphalian straightjacket” and develop more nuanced understandings of diffuse global structures and how agents operate within, reproduce, and reshape them.

Anarchist theories of how justice and social order can be established outside of the state apparatus can also help IR scholars interested in ethics and global justice further explore the possibility of universal principles which simultaneously recognize the value of the local and the specific, a dilemma which underscores the communitarian/cosmopolitan debate and which anarchist literature has long sought to achieve balance. Finally, looking to anarchist political theory for insights into anarchy may simply be wiser than relying on social contract theories of anarchy for the sole reason that the social contract theorists provide 'solutions' to their anarchies: the establishment of sovereign states, a process which is unlikely to have an international equivalent for some time, if ever.

Conclusion
This paper has introduced anarchist political theory to an International Relations audience in the hopes

113 Rosenberg, 'What's the Matter With Realism?'
117 Wendt, 'Why a World State is Inevitable'.
of both problematizing IR’s current conceptions of anarchy and providing new avenues through which
anarchy can be more positively conceived. We have argued that the dominant images of anarchy which
find prominence in IR major paradigms deploy a global ordering principle that is rooted in social
contractarianism. This negative image of anarchy associates problems of violence and uncertainty a
priori to the international structure of anarchy, rather than to other phenomena such as global economic
dynamics and Westphalian sovereignty. We have introduced, briefly, several major strains in anarchist
thinking in an attempt to broaden IR conceptions of anarchy beyond social contract theory – to
'reimagine' the domestic analogy, and to give an answer to a question posed by Daniel Deudney: why
“pre-state anarchy is so insecure while interstate anarchy... is not”\textsuperscript{118}. Finally, we have suggested
possible avenues for future research in which new images of anarchy can be compared with existing
problems and debates in IR scholarship, particularly those which address communities of nations and
global dynamics of economic change which transcend state-focussed analyses.

\textsuperscript{118} Deudney, \textit{Bounding Power}, 34.